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Abstract 
 
This article argues that potential EU membership can function as a powerful impulse for the 
modernization of the economic, political and social systems of candidate countries. To illustrate 
this, evidence of the transformations of the Romanian state-societal interactions in the transition 
period are discussed, with special focus on privatization, enterprise restructuring and competition 
policy. The article also explains why the Europeanization process has so far worked more slowly 
and less effectively in Romania than in other Central and Eastern European countries. This 
analysis could be used as a learning experience for prospective EU members to adjust to the 
European environment.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The current EU enlargement process is undoubtedly the EU’s amplest ever in terms 
of scope, diversity and number of issues involved. In 2004, after 15 years of transition to a 
market economy, eight former communist countries joined the European family. However, 
Romania and Bulgaria missed out on the first wave of this enlargement, remaining at the 
doorstep of the Union for a while.  
As of January, 1, 2007, Romania has joined the European Union, following the 
recommendation of the European Commission in its September 26 Monitoring Report and 
the ratification of the Accession Treaty by the national Parliaments of the EU-25 states. 
This paper illustrates how the prospects of joining the EU club have constituted a 
solid external anchor for the transformation of the country throughout its uneven 
transition3, and points out that the new Romanian path, forged by EU membership, has 
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been a strong incentive for the Government to continue the pace of reform, improve key 
areas of the country’s economic performance and create a sound business climate. 
  Particular attention is paid in this article to explain the reasons for Romania’s 
protracted accession process, using evidence of state-societal interactions. Sometimes, the 
forces of Europeanization had to struggle with the preferences of domestic actors involved 
with policy making and with their capacities to exploit new opportunities (e.g. attracting 
strategic foreign investors). The preferences were for slow rhythm of reform, slow pace of 
privatization and maintaining a great share of the state property – permitting control, 
corruption and rents. At the same time, domestic actors were not inclined to restructure old 
enterprises, which meant cutting off the number of workers. This would have created social 
tensions and the loss of a great number of votes in political elections. The adjustment 
pressures exerted by the EU are not the only factor that should be considered when 
analyzing the response of the national system of governance to these pressures. There are a 
number of facilitating (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Radaelli, 2000) or hindering conditions (for 
Romania, see Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006) that determine the outcome of this response. 
Despite the significant growth of the literature on Europeanization, much of the 
debate has predominantly focused on the way in which old EU member states are being 
transformed by EU membership. The impact of Europeanization on post-communist 
Eastern and Central European countries has not been sufficiently explored; therefore the 
present analysis aims to fill this gap. 
This article first offers some insights from the Europeanization literature and 
clarifies the concept of “Europeanization”. A general picture of the Europeanization of 
Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) is then presented. Next, the paper highlights 
those factors that have delayed Europeanization and hampered economic growth in 
Romania. The same section supplies evidence of the EU impact on Romanian state-societal 
interactions, with special attention paid to privatization, enterprise restructuring and 
competition policy. It also outlines the new Romanian path towards EU integration. The 
concluding remarks of the last section could be useful to policy makers in an enlarged 
Union to improve the capacity of prospective EU members to adjust to the European 
environment.   
 
2. Insights from the Europeanization literature 
  
European integration researchers increasingly employ the concept of 
Europeanization to assess European sources of domestic politics. This shift from a direct 
study of European institutions to a more indirect approach via the national political field 
started in the 1990’s through collections of data regarding the institutional adjustment of 
member states to EU membership (Rometsch and Wessels, 1996; Hanf and Soetendorp, 
1998; Zeff and Pirro, 2001). Another orientation has now evolved, focusing more generally 
on changes in national political systems that can be attributed to European integration. Here 
we can mention the relevant empirical data that have recently been provided in Green 
Cowles et al. (2001). More reflective contributions can be found in Hix and Goetz (2000); 
Risse et al. (2001); and Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002). The study of the Europeanization of 
former communist countries who have recently joined the Union forms a new research 
agenda, as illustrated in Demetropoulou (2002), Borislavova-Spendzharova (2003) and 
Cernat (2006). 
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 Consequently, the concept of “Europeanization” has come to refer to the impact of 
the EU integration process and EU institutions on national politics and policy making. 
Recent bibliographic surveys exploring the range of conceptual nuances of Europeanization 
and the various sub-fields in which the concept has been applied are offered by Olsen 
(2002) and Featherstone (2003). The Europeanization process is viewed as a one-way 
influence, from the supranational to the national level (Ladrech, 1994), or as a two-way 
interaction between the two levels in which member states assimilate the influence of the 
EU and in turn project their interests at the EU level (Bulmer and Burch, 2000). In order to 
account for the EU impact on the larger domestic discourse, identities, political structures 
and public policies, Radaelli (2000: 3) adopts a definition referring to: 
Processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies. 
 Other authors, such as Majone (1990), have provided a more open definition of 
Europeanization based on the deregulation-regulation, or re-regulation, dimension. This 
conceptualization praises Europeanization for bringing depoliticization, removal of 
planning and public ownership, together with regulatory powers entrusted to experts, 
commissions and independent agencies. In the same spirit, but with a critical nuance, 
Scharpf (1996) refers to the influence of the EU as negative integration, arguing that the EU 
institutions have largely promoted a neo-liberal form of economic integration, with few 
matching efforts in building a system of interest representation at the supranational level. 
These features fuel the claims that Europeanization is “globalization by another name” or 
“globalization with a human face”.  
  Schimmmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) call instead for a better coordination 
between the theoretical studies of the impact of international organizations, the European 
literature, the more theoretical literature on the transformations in the CEECs, and the 
mainly descriptive literature on the effect of the EU on candidate countries, which is often 
limited to single countries and single policy areas.  
 Finally, one aspect concerning the Europeanization literature is worth mentioning. 
The analyses involved in this field could be concerned with the questions of why or how 
states decide to surrender aspects of their sovereignty to supranational polities – the 
ontological stage of research. On the other hand, the focus of Europeanization research 
could be post-ontological, as it explores what happens after states join the EU and 
supranational institutions begin to produce their effects. It can be noted that the focus of 
most Europeanization research is indeed post-ontological. The present analysis will cover 
both stages, taking into account EU conditionality in the pre-accession period.  
 
3. The Europeanization of Central and East European Countries 
  
When referring to CEECs as aspiring EU candidates, Europeanization can be 
understood as the conceptual framework which links integration and transition to a market 
economy. Thus, it acquires a more specific meaning - as a process of systemic 
transformation based on a set of special requirements for full EU membership. States that 
are not law-governed or are not market-oriented liberal democracies cannot be granted the 
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status of a EU member. The EU functions as a reference model for the modernization of the 
political, economic and social systems of the candidate countries in transition, and 
Europeanization becomes a series of operations leading to systemic convergence through 
the processes of democratization, marketization, stabilization and institutional inclusion 
(Demetropoulou, 2000:  197-217). Table 1 provides a summary of the momentum of EU 
conditionality on acceding countries. 
Table 1 presents the main official concrete steps followed by Romania and its key 
institutions in order to comply with the requirements of the Europeanization process. 
Conforming to this conditionality (made up of agreements, specific criteria, dialogues, 
negotiations, complex procedures, European programmes) meant boosting progress in the 
EU candidates, aligning them to a certain discipline. Without all these mandatory steps, the 
modernization process of these countries is likely to have been much slower. 
 Once socialism collapsed, considerable differences among these countries became 
apparent, even if the great majority of them shared the common aspirations of EU 
membership. Countries with favorable initial conditions, such as Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, where adjustment costs were low, while ethnic homogeneity and traditions 
of democracy and capitalism were significant, entered a virtuous circle and qualified for EU 
benefits earlier (Vachudova, 2002). By contrast, in countries like Bulgaria and Romania, 
with unfavorable initial conditions, weak civil society, a lack of strong democratic and 
capitalist traditions and an unstable environment, the Europeanization process unfolded 
sluggishly and wastefully. 
 In explaining what accounts for the different developments in the CEECs, two 
country-specific factors may be invoked. The first factor is related to the conjecture that 
developments in the countries themselves, rather than internationally-induced 
transformations, are the driving force of change. Katchanovski (2000) has performed a 
quantitative study on the cultural and historical determinants of reform in a broader group 
of post-communist countries. He finds that culture, defined in terms of civil society, social 
capital, trust, religious and business ethics, and historical experience, indirectly affects 
growth by influencing economic reform policy, macroeconomic stabilization, corruption 
and war. The second country-specific factor is geographic position. Kopstein and Reilly 
(2000) sustain that geographic proximity to the EU is an important predictor of successful 
European integration. 
 Notwithstanding the significance of the findings of the above studies, a key aspect 
is worth mentioning here. In the case of CEECs, a close connection with the EU is an 
extraordinary chance to overcome the backwardness trap and fulfil a century-old aspiration 
to modernization (Dăianu and Vrânceanu, 2002: 24). The requirements of the EU acquis 
comunautaire could be a propelling force for reducing the economic gaps vis-à-vis the 
advanced European states. Moreover, countries located outside the geographical zone of 
“good performance” should not be considered inferior to countries with the “right” 
geographic location. There is no recipe for what should produce an excellent and stable EU 
candidate. This idea supports the main argument of our paper, namely that external, 
European influences can induce vast domestic changes in acceding countries. Cernat (2000) 
builds a map (see Figure 1) presenting the main external influences that could affect the 
institutional choices made by CEECs during the transition process.  
Beside the Europeanization factors, the CEECs were affected by other external 
forces. These forces acted both in a coercive manner (like the “policy transfer” imposed by 
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the EU), and as a “policy learning” or “policy diffusion” process. Figure 1 draws a parallel 
between these external factors.  
The first external influence is that of the EU, which exerted a coercive policy 
transfer.  
The impact of other member states or other CEECs may also be a significant 
external factor, given the numerous channels of interaction between them, allowing for best 
practice policies and institutions that are successfully implemented in one country to be 
emulated by others. But this impact is not coercive and relies mainly on the willingness of 
the recipient country to learn from its peers. Therefore, instead of coercive policy transfer 
mechanisms, this interaction is best understood as “policy learning”.  
The impact of global governance, as developed by international organizations, is 
typically a case of policy transfer. For the most part coercive, given the lending 
conditionality imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, both institutions rely on policy 
transfer linked to financial assistance.  
Finally, in the case of markets and private actors, as in the case of “policy learning”, 
the level of coercion is minimal or non-existent. Moreover, unlike the transfer of best 
practices and institutions, the linkages between measures adopted by recipient countries and 
specific external forces are more elusive, since the structure of the external force (MNCs – 
multinational corporations, NGOs – non-governmental organizations, etc.) is more diffuse. 
Therefore, this influence of markets and private actors falls closer to what can be called 
“policy diffusion”.  
Studies of economic integration of CEECs into the global economy (Inotai, 1999; 
Iankova, 2001; Wallace, 2000) discuss three main types of factors that can give significant 
impulse to Europeanization: 
(a) legal harmonization through the adoption of the acquis communautaire; 
(b) EU financial assistance, in particular the Poland and Hungary Action for the 
Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE); and  
(c) the process of twinning. 
Let us briefly describe each in turn. 
 (a) The adoption of the acquis communautaire 
 The EU has made membership conditional upon the adoption of the acquis 
communautaire, which is the creation of the legal and institutional machinery necessary for 
the effective transfer of EU’s objectives and policies, as well as its existing legislation and 
regulatory system.  
 The acquis communautaire is primarily a legal concept. Its 31 chapters had to be 
implemented by the candidate countries, with the European Commission acting as a 
guardian who checks how this body of settled laws is transferred and enforced both before 
and after accession. At the same time, the acquis should be treated as a far wider concept. 
Some neo-institutionalist authors, such as Bulmer (1994), have demonstrated that EU law is 
not only about legal decisions but also modifies the “institutional capacity” of the actors 
involved.  
 It is also important to observe that the adoption of the acquis communautaire 
functions both as a formal condition for accession and as a key indicator of the extent of 
Europeanization in CEECs. By setting up explicit criteria for membership and regularly 
assessing how far the candidate countries are from meeting them, the EU has positively 
influenced the economic, social and institutional progress of these countries.  
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 (b) EU financial assistance 
 Financial assistance has been a key factor in enhancing the capacity of CEECs to 
adjust to EU standards. A significant technical assistance instrument was the PHARE 
programme, which assisted countries through investments aimed at improving the 
regulatory adoption of the acquis. But the availability of PHARE funds depended upon 
progress towards membership, being conditioned upon fulfillment of a set of criteria 
formulated by the EU. Acting as coercive policy transfers, PHARE and other financial 
assistance programmes contributed a great deal to the transformation of institutional 
building and of the regulatory framework of CEECs.  
 The main issue here remains the administrative and judiciary capacity of these 
countries to absorb European funds. Hence, additional assistance depends on increasing 
CEEC’s capacity to manage and use funds effectively (EC, 2002). 
 (c) Twinning 
 EU twinning projects were officially launched in May 1998, and were the 
implementing companions of legal harmonization. The EU initiated a process of transfer of 
expertise, encouraging the influx of national experts and civil servants from EU member 
states to CEECs.  
 Unlike other Europeanization mechanisms, twinning acted as a “horizontal policy 
transfer”, from EU member states to CEECs, of “best practices” in coping with EU 
requirements, rather than a vertical, coercive process.  
 
 The above description of the three Europeanization factors shows that the prospect 
of EU accession has influenced virtually every aspect of post-communist change reform in 
the candidate countries. It also seems that the element of EU conditionality defining the 
relationship between the EU and CEECs has rendered EU influence over these countries 
more pervasive than its influence over existing EU members. This is also the conclusion of 
a study by Grabbe (1999). 
 
4. Romania’s experience 
  
Unfavorable initial conditions 
 Romania had a lower start in the Europeanization process than the post-communist 
countries included in the 2004 wave of EU accession. In the early 1990s, it was plagued by 
endemic economic crises and changing governments lacking the vision, will, and 
capabilities to undertake painful structural reforms (World Bank, 2002). 
 Empirical evidence enables us to remark that the burden of the Europeanization 
process usually falls on domestic elites and governments pressured to speed up reforms and 
thus meet the EU accession criteria. The sooner elites agree on essential issues such as 
privatization, the smoother and faster the transition from communism to capitalism. In the 
case of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), there was a consensus for 
capitalism from the onset of transition, simply because the communist parties there already 
exhausted the possibilities of reforming the socialist economy before 1989. In Romania, on 
the other hand, governments in the first years of transition tried an in-between approach and 
failed. This attempt only managed to create over one million property-related lawsuits, 
generate hyperinflation which impoverished millions of people, prevent the emergence of a 
land market until 1999, and shape an entrepreneurial class closer to the Russian oligarchic 
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model than to the Central European one. Policy changed only after 2000, with the Leftist 
parties agreeing to keep the economy open to competition and foreign investment. 
 Failure to create a “more equitable” market economy (the social democrats’ favorite 
project) was not uniquely responsible for their conversion to market liberalism. European 
integration became their first political priority. The people of Romania welcomed the idea 
of joining the EU, and compared their country’s weak performance against that of the 
Central European countries. Romania’s laggard situation during most of its transition 
period was a point of constant criticism by the media. The Social Democrat Party of 
Romania (PDSR), as the main political party, in power for most of the period, needed the 
Romanian economy to become successfully integrated with the European one. 
Consequently, seeking European recognition was the Social Democrats’ next urgent 
objective after securing domestic domination. Romania’s former communists were 
genuinely convinced of the advantages of Romania’s joining the EU. Political parties 
became preoccupied with developing connections with groups within the European 
Parliament. Even the PRM (the ‘Great Romania’ Party) sought to change from an anti-
Semitic party into a more acceptable, European one. All these specific circumstances 
produced what Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) describes as “Europeanization without 
decommunization: a case of elite conversion”. In Romania, in the early 1990s, the exit path 
from the totalitarian regime did not lead to democracy, but instead to some form of mild 
authoritarian populism. What is exceptional in the case of Romania is that it is the only 
post-communist country which succeeded in engaging on the European path with a balance 
of power clearly in favor of the former communist elites (Mungiu, 2006). 
The existence of the European option prevented Romania from remaining in a 
situation similar to that of Albania, and from regressing to become a new Belarus. The 
incentive of European integration lured even the successors of communism and encouraged 
the pro-change constituency. It can be said that, in the recent period, European integration 
and the prospect of accession to the EU have shaped Romanian politics more than any 
constitution or electoral law. Transition with a European perspective seems indeed the best: 
it provides a faster and safer route to democracy and prosperity. In addition, European 
integration offers a shelter against the instability and perturbations of the rest of the world. 
 However, Romania faces a rough ride to overcome the unfavorable initial 
conditions and catch up with the EU. It has an income per capita that represents only 35% 
of the EU average, being at the same time a country with a relatively large population (22 
million), as compared to the average in Central and Eastern Europe. A comparison between 
population and GDP per capita in Romania and the other CEECs is presented in Table 2.  
Under the hypothesis of an average rate of economic growth of 6% for Romania, 
while the EU average rate of economic growth would be 2%, the country would need 10 
years to reach half the average EU income per capita. Closing up this gap (at purchasing 
power parity) would take about two generations, assuming that a substantial growth 
differential in Romania’s favor is maintained during this period (Dăianu, 2007).  
In conclusion, while the Europeanization factors have clearly had a positive impact 
on Romania’s economic progress, unfavorable initial conditions are still likely to determine 
a rather long and protracted timeframe for the country to catch up with EU levels.  
The Europeanization of state-industry relations 
 The most urgent actions during the accession process were the state-industry 
relations and industrial policies. EU impact on state-industry relations in Romania can be 
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summarized in relation to three main areas: (a) privatization; (b) enterprise restructuring 
and (c) competition policy. 
(a) Privatization 
The EU has assisted Romania in its privatization efforts through its PHARE 
programme, both through support for general policy development via national privatization 
institutions and through support for individual enterprises. PHARE provided the 
professional skills required for private enterprise and management at a time when they were 
in very short supply in Romania. Institution-building consisted of support to a number of 
agencies that were, over time, directly involved in the process of privatization: the State 
Ownership Fund (SOF) and its successor, the Authority for Privatization and 
Administration of State Ownership (APAPS), Private Ownership Funds (POFs), and the 
Ministry of Privatization. An important associated PHARE activity was support for public 
awareness campaigns, ensuring that citizens would claim the certificates or vouchers 
available to them under the mass privatization programmes. 
Unfortunately, in the first years of transition, the political environment did not favor 
PHARE support. In those years, PHARE technical assistance was easily discarded when 
policy advice did not meet political priorities. As already mentioned, pre-1996 Romanian 
governments were only half-heartedly committed to a sustained privatization strategy, 
forcing PHARE programmes to underperform for a while. In some cases, political 
opposition delayed the establishment of the necessary institutional arrangements for 
PHARE implementation to take place.  
Privatization has usually been seen as a cure for state-owned companies’ lack of 
efficiency and for the central budget’s lack of funds. Privatization creates better conditions 
for restructuring, frequently via improved corporate governance and capital inflows. Yet, as 
many cases in Romania show, privatization is not a success story ipso facto, for a number 
of reasons: unfriendly market conditions, unfair competition (there were cases where the 
acquirer closed the acquired company, because the latter posed competitive threats on the 
former), union pressures, or just the new owner being unable to change the loss-making 
features of the privatized company (Voinea, 2002). 
The privatization mechanisms used in Romania during the transition period can be 
classified as follows: (1) the mass privatization programme (MPP); (2) management 
employee buy-out (MEBO); (3) direct sales to outsiders, implying contractual arrangements 
with chosen investors; (4) auctions; and (5) privatization through capital market channels. 
(1) The MPP, based on various distribution schemes through which the property 
rights for SOEs were transferred to citizens for free (by issuing vouchers or coupons), 
failed to produce the expected advantages, because the institutional arrangements did not 
place poorly performing managers under pressure from external threats of takeovers or 
bankruptcy. Neither did the Romanian MPP produce an internal surveillance mechanism 
for managerial performance via shareholders. The only constraint mechanism left in place 
was political, resulting in the Romanian MPP more closely resembling the institutional 
architecture of “state corporatism cum political clientelism” (Cernat, 2006: 53). The 
financial institutions created by the state to handle the privatization process (SOF and 
POFs) were entirely captured by the industrial elites interested in delaying the process until 
insiders were in a favorable position to take control as new owners. 
Corporate governance problems appeared as a consequence of the diffusion of 
control within the privatized companies. However, this stimulated the trade with vouchers 
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(partially on the black market), which in turn stimulated an unofficial capital market.  It is 
not a simple coincidence that the Bucharest stock exchange (BSE) and the secondary 
market (RASDAQ) were set up soon thereafter. 
(2) The MEBO method (prevailing during 1993-1996, with a peak in 1994), 
incorporated specific measures for transferring enterprises to their own managers and 
employees, sometimes at highly preferential prices. This method was deemed fair in that 
ownership was transferred to employees already considered “stakeholders”. However, in an 
economic system characterized by an excess supply of labor and a lack of good managers, 
insider ownership is unlikely to produce radical restructuring (which is essential for 
ensuring profitability and efficiency), particularly if this may disadvantage the insiders 
themselves. It can be noted that MEBO before restructuring is a recipe for failure. 
According to the SOF official documents, between, 1992 and 2000, the majority of the 18% 
of those privatized firms whose economic position deteriorated after privatization were 
firms privatized through the MEBO method. The predominance of MEBO as the main 
method of privatization before 1996 was due less to its objective necessity or economic 
advantages, and more to the lack of interest in other privatization methods, especially those 
involving foreign investors. This in turn can be easily explained by Romanian party 
politics. PDSR (the main Leftist party) supported MEBO because it allowed them to please 
their main clientele: trade unions and managers of SOEs.   
 (3) Direct sales were predominant during 1996-1998; they accounted for 68.7% of 
all privatization deals in 1996, respectively 81.6% in 1997, and for 65.8% of large 
privatization deals in 1998. 
In the context of transition, the role of state policies in attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is crucial. FDI is the best solution for problems encountered by SOEs 
(such as low profitability, lack of competent management, over-employment, obsolete 
technologies, poor marketing skills). In the case of Romania, strategic privatization did not 
produce the desired effects (namely, creating a competitive business environment and 
promoting the transfer of technology).   
 Direct sale to external investors, especially in 1997 and 1998 (when Romania 
experienced an acute lack of foreign currency) became an auction of privileges, with 
investors treating it as a preliminary condition to settle their plants in the country. The 
investors’ position was strengthened by the scarcity of internal capital necessary for 
restructuring and by their positive impact on local industrial and social networks (jobs, 
productivity, and wages). This situation created a preferential treatment and, after the 
privatization process, the market power thus obtained allowed the new foreign owners to 
use it for operating in a non-competitive manner. Other potential capital flows might have 
been prevented from entering the market by certain barriers created by the initial investors. 
 A notorious example is the case of the telecommunications company Romtelecom, 
sold to the Greek company OTE, with the foreign investor being granted a monopoly for 5 
years. During this period, prices for fixed phone calls increased in a thrilling spiral, 
anecdotal evidence showing that in 2002 it was three times more expensive to call from 
Romania to Greece than from Greece to Romania. 
 Moreover, instead of channeling negotiations with private investors towards ways to 
promote the transfer of technology and know-how, the real policy objectives of the 
government of the day were aimed at avoiding labor shedding. Thus, Government 
Ordinance 48/1997 imposed clear restrictions on the ability of future private owners to 
                                             European Research Studies, Volume XII, Issue (1) 2009 
 
 
26
reduce the labor force. Any privatization contract had to contain clauses regarding the 
conditions under which layoffs could occur. Trade unions had to be informed prior to the 
conclusion of any privatization deal and, if such layoffs were approved, appropriate 
compensatory payments had to be granted.  
 As a consequence, in the period 1991-2002, FDI in Romania was never spectacular 
(see Table 3). The total inward FDI stock in the period 1989-2002 is rather moderate, i.e. 
slightly over $8.5 billion (about 20% of GDP). Other transition economies performed better 
in gross and relative terms. The annual net FDI inflows, even in 2002, are below the level 
of foreign remittances, and barely cover for three weeks of imports. Top 1% of foreign 
investors accounts for 80% of total foreign investment (Voinea, 2002).  
In the group of candidate countries to the EU, Romania and Bulgaria were the worst 
performers in attracting FDI over the transition period (see Table 4). 
 Only in recent years, the perspective of Romania’s accession to the EU, NATO 
membership and the flat income tax of 16% have determined a sharp rise in FDI penetration 
in the national economy. For example, in 2005 FDI registered EUR 5.2 billion, and for 2006 
the figure is over EUR 8 billion. For 2007, the Romanian Agency for Foreign Investment 
reports approximately EUR 10 billion, mainly due to the EU accession. 
 (4) Auctions (used on a wider scale since 1998) were meant to eliminate disputes 
over the selling price, as it had to be the best price offered, not the absolutely best price. 
However, the method runs the risk of receiving offers that would conflict with the public 
interest. Evaluation, based on arbitrarily set scales, also runs the risk of being subjective. 
This method of privatization has intrinsic problems, which tend to make it slow and 
uncertain (Earle and Telegdy, 2002). Multi-criteria tenders involved a lack of transparency 
in the process because there were no announced or pre-determined weights for the various 
aspects of the bid and potential participants were left guessing about the trade-offs among 
them. The bids were not publicly revealed after the tender, making it difficult to monitor 
the State Ownership Fund’s decisions. Given the lack of an objective criterion and the non-
transparency of the process, the selection decision could be easily manipulated, creating the 
appearance (if not always the reality) of corruption. Indeed, even a perfectly clean process 
organized by honest, well-intentioned bureaucrats is subject to corruption charges, because 
there is little defense against allegations of favoritism. As most of the bureaucrats were less 
than honest, they acted as rent-seekers both by taking bribes in the privatization process and 
by colluding with the enterprise managers to strip assets before privatization.  
 (5) Privatization through capital market channels had relatively poor results, in line 
with the poor performance of the Romanian capital market institutions. An example is that 
of the car company Dacia Pitesti. SOF first negotiated directly with the French buyer 
Renault, and then (when everything, including the selling price, was settled), Renault 
bought the Dacia shares listed at the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE).  
 As an indication of the slow privatization prospects through the BSE, there are cases 
in which typical portfolio investors acquired the majority stake in a listed company, mainly 
in order to protect their initial lower investment either from poor management in the 
absence of privatization or from a foreign investor that would not like strong minority 
stakeholders. Many typical portfolio investors are put in the atypical situation to act as 
direct investors, and this may explain in part the protracted restructuring which occurs in 
many sectors of the Romanian industry.  
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The evidence discussed under items (1) to (5) above proves that the pace of 
privatization was very slow. This is also illustrated by the private sector’s share of GDP. In 
1998, this was less than 60 per cent in Romania, while Hungary reached 80 per cent, the 
Czech Republic 75 per cent and the Baltic states around 70 per cent (IMF, 1999: 21). 
Instead of creating incentives and political support for further reforms, Romanian officials 
maintained conditions (such as massive state ownership) feeding rent-seeking behavior 
(Tache and Lixăndroiu, 2006a), which is in sharp contrast with a well-functioning market 
economy. 
(b) Enterprise restructuring 
In Romania, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises has proved one of the most 
difficult reforms to implement. Enterprises have found ways to transfer, temporarily or 
permanently, some of their economic problems to their creditors (other enterprises, banks, 
or the state), thus avoiding a painful restructuring that would have solved problems related 
to inefficiency, salary costs and outdated technologies. Many state-owned enterprises 
decided not to pay or to postpone payment, and did not suffer the appropriate 
consequences. Creditors, often “captive”, decided to help enterprises in financial distress by 
rolling over payments, reducing or cancelling debts. 
Restructuring was much delayed because of the hidden state subsidies for 
underperformance. Successive governments sent conflicting signals by admitting in public 
statements that arrears were a serious problem, but rushing in many cases to block decisive 
action whenever energy companies tried to disconnect bad debtors. As a result, industrial 
companies that had piled enormous bill arrears only had to be patient and never lose 
confidence that the government would, eventually, come to their rescue. For instance, in 
2002 the government issued numerous decrees and norms to reschedule the debts over 
various periods and/or prevent utilities from cutting supply. A Government Ordinance of 
2002 allowed utilities to write off debtors’ penalties and reschedule their debts if they paid 
their current bills on time. On request from the debtors, the unpaid bills of 2000 and 2001 
were rescheduled in the form of monthly installments. Debt-related fines and penalties were 
either to be remitted or postponed after the last installment of the rescheduled debt. While 
there may be some merit in providing support to redress strategic economic units, the 
problem that remains is the unfairness created by the Ordinance and affecting those 
consumers who regularly paid their bills on time. As a consequence, a large number of 
healthy companies have also chosen to maximize profits and optimize their behavior by 
accumulating arrears.  
Tax arrears were used as a device to soften the budget constraints of Romanian 
companies, and the government’s attempt to use tax policy to accomplish restructuring 
objectives is a consequence of the slow transition strategy adopted by Romania (Tache and 
Lixăndroiu, 2006b). 
Enterprise restructuring has been a very difficult area for interventions by PHARE 
(EC, 1998). However, the Industrial Restructuring and Professional Re-conversion 
Programme (RICOP) delivered good results. Another notable success was a joint PHARE-
EBRD project for the evaluation of all state-owned commercial companies to identify those 
that had a better chance of being sold to strategic investors. 
In sum, while enterprise restructuring can be considered as a major indicator of 
Europeanization, it has overall failed to produce the expected progressive results, due to 
unfavorable domestic conditions, in particular political attitudes and behaviors. 
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(c) Competition policy 
Competition policy rules are important in post-communist countries because the 
legacy of central planning is concentrated in market structures where strong pressures for 
state assistance to enterprises in difficulty could not be resisted. Only in 2004, the amount 
of state aids authorized by the Romanian Competition Council was $ 1.8 billion. In 
Romania, lack of competition culture is still a problem that poses difficulties in the business 
environment. It has allowed all governments after 1989 to offer assistance to and favor 
different economic sectors, without paying attention to market signals. Over a period of 14 
years, about EUR 16 billion have been extracted from the state budget in the form of (more 
or less screened) state aids. If only one-third of this amount had been used for other 
purposes (such as a complex highway project), the Romanian economy would have been in 
better condition now.  
Notwithstanding these problems, EU policy transfer has had an important impact on 
competition policy. The adoption of EU competition rules on state-aid, the abuse of 
dominance, monopolization or merger control, for instance, had a significant role in 
improving state-industry relations.  
The weight of arguments related to the EU acquis and other international 
commitments helped competition authorities to impose their viewpoint. For example, a case 
in which competition policy influenced state-industry relations was that of Letea Bacau, the 
only Romanian producer of special printing paper. The privatization deal concluded by 
SOF was not allowed by the Romanian Competition Council. SOF argued that the only way 
it could attract a strategic foreign investor for Letea was to sell all of its shares, accounting 
for 75% of Letea’s equity, the remaining shares having been distributed within the MPP. 
Taking into account the fact that Letea had a monopolistic situation in the production of 
printing paper for newspapers, the Competition Council had to approve the deal, according 
to EU regulations. However, it appeared later that, out of all interested investors, SOF had 
selected a rather obscure Cyprus company, which was in fact owned by one of the largest 
Romanian media companies. So, the deal would have created a dangerous business 
agglomeration in that sector. As a consequence, the Competition Council asked to examine 
the ownership and corporate structure of the Cyprus company and, in the end, canceled that 
privatization deal. 
The Competition Council, established for aligning Romania with the Community 
law, has generally produced satisfactory results. The number of decisions issued by the 
Competition Council has increased, and its sanctions policy is now a more effective 
deterrent. It can be concluded that, while the outcomes of competition policy were poor 
during most of the transition period, there are recent signs of revival and improvement.  
The above discussion indicates that the effectiveness of efforts to promote a 
European model of industrial relations and to create a functioning market economy through 
privatization, enterprise restructuring and strengthened competition policies were restricted 
by various domestic factors such as institutional weaknesses and poor receptivity of 
decision-making actors engaged in clientelistic relations.   
The new Romanian path 
Romania’s inclusion in the European integration process initiated a set of 
procedures aimed at elaborating rapidly and efficiently the necessary steps for the eventual 
EU accession. 
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 Table 5 summarizes the institutions established to better coordinate Romania’s 
participation in the European integration process and to facilitate the country’s systemic 
adjustment to EU norms. 
The decision of the European Council in Helsinki to invite Romania to start 
negotiations has given new momentum to the country’s efforts to update its institutional 
structures and bring them closer to Western levels. A national programme for accession 
was initiated in 2000. The substantial growth, reorientation and allocation of pre-accession 
PHARE assistance, the introduction of ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development), participation in new programmes and the extension of Twinning have 
eventually led to important institutional adjustments for the better management of foreign 
assistance projects. 
Examples proving the beneficial influence of the EU on the current privatization, 
restructuring and competition policies could be found in the energy field and in the 
liquidation of some big industrial platforms. On the occasion of recently adopting the 
national long-term power strategy by the Supreme Council of Defense (September 2007), 
Romania’s president Traian Basescu has pointed out the necessity of continuing the 
privatization with producers like the power stations Rovinari, Turceni and Mintia, and of 
finding solutions for the adjustment of government strategy to the requirements of the EU 
accession treaty (Bursa, 2007). 
The case of the “Tractorul” industrial platform of Brasov can also be mentioned 
here. The European Commission has just begun an investigation concerning the potential 
infringement of the EU treaty due to a state aid granted by the Romanian authorities for the 
privatization of the factory. Romania was asked to suspend any illegal aids until the 
European authorities decided on their adequacy. Romanian officials imposed some 
conditions for the privatization of the factory, such as maintaining a certain level of 
economic activity during a period of 10 years and a re-hiring of the former employees. The 
European Commission is checking now if the respective conditions had determined lower 
selling prices as compared to those of an unconditional privatization, in which case those 
conditions could be considered as a form of state aid. 
After a series of large shocks, industrial production has had a remarkable recovery. 
A high appreciation of the RON, caused by huge capital inflows and a sharp rise in energy 
prices (as a condition of adjusting internal prices to EU levels), has strained quite a few 
industries over the recent years. The speed of industrial production recovery suggests that 
several Romanian sectors are on course towards adapting their management techniques and 
upgrading their capital endowment with new technologies, in order to cope with 
competition within the EU.  
The private sector contribution to GDP is almost 70%, and it accounts for over 55% 
of the social capital and more than 70% of the employed population. The steady expansion 
of the private sector in the economy has in turn generated more entrepreneurial drive, more 
capital formation and export orientation.  
Despite the achievements mentioned above, the process of full integration into 
European structures has not yet ended, more efforts being required in order to fulfil 
European standards and norms. However, as the EU membership was secured, policy 
slippages could appear. With EU accession having taken place as of 1 January 2007, we are 
now receiving signals that the removal of the accession policy and the chasing of votes 
                                             European Research Studies, Volume XII, Issue (1) 2009 
 
 
30
from a conservative opposition may significantly reduce the resolve of the government and 
other political agents to continue Europeanization at the same accelerated pace. 
The new path Romania seems to have embarked upon over the following years 
involves: (1) an improved internal management of EU-assisted projects, through the 
activity of domestic institutions established to better coordinate the country’s adjustment to 
EU procedures, standards and norms; (2) an increasing number of positive instances which 
demonstrate that Europeanization has had a beneficial influence on privatization, 
restructuring processes and competition policies (especially in the energy field and 
regarding the liquidation of some large industrial platforms).  
The encouraging outcomes of the past few years have not been sufficient to relax 
the EC close monitoring of Romania’s compliance with the new laws and regulations, and 
have further emphasized the need for government policy and action to complete the 
privatization of large units and the restructuring of the energy sector, and to invest 
substantially and decisively in infrastructure.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Contributing to the new research agenda of the impact of Europeanization on post-
communist countries, this paper shows that inclusion in the European project has had a 
tremendous, generally positive, influence on the modernization and development of 
CEECs, irrespective of their geopolitical circumstances.  
The EU influence may be observed through a wide range of factors, both internal 
and external, as well as embedded in even larger processes of change. Obstacles such as 
initial conditions, bureaucratic and party politics and issues of sequencing and learning are 
shaping the impact of the EU in CEECs, sometimes reinforcing existing features as much 
as altering them.  
The description of the three main types of Europeanization factors shows that the 
perspective of joining the EU has influenced virtually all aspects of post-communist reform 
in the candidate countries.  
While the Europeanization factors have obviously had a positive impact on 
Romania’s economic progress, unfavorable initial conditions determined a protracted 
timeframe for the country to catch up with EU levels. The effectiveness of efforts to 
promote a European model of industrial relations and to create a functioning market 
economy through privatization, enterprise restructuring and strengthened competition 
policies were restricted by poor receptivity of decision-making actors engaged in 
clientelistic relations.  
In Romania, because the preferences of domestic decision makers were in favor of a 
slow reform, any acceleration of the process can be legitimately attributed to the impact of 
external, European forces rather than to an endogenous transformation induced by domestic 
actors. The extensive support of the EU has led to complex processes of absorption and 
change.  
However, it seems that the process of Europeanization is not just a technical one. It 
is also a matter of political will.  
During the next decade, other post-communist countries of Europe will provide the 
test ground for determining whether the mechanisms of the Europeanization process are 
indeed working to promote a market economy in credible EU candidates. 
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Table 1. The momentum of EU conditionality on acceding countries 
 
First step 
 
 
Europe Agreements 
 
Second Step 
 
 
Copenhagen criteria 
 
Europe Agreements 
 
 
PHARE Programmes 
 
 
White Paper4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Step 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essen Pre-accession 
Strategy 
 
Structured Dialogue 
 
 
European Conference 
 
 
Accession Negotiation Process 
 
 
Accession Negotiations 
 
 
Screening of the Acquis 
 
 
Review Procedure 
 
 
Europe Agreements 
 
 
Accession Partnerships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fourth Step 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agenda 2000 – 
Reinforced Pre-
accession Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accession 
Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinforced 
Pre-
accession 
Strategy 
 
Pre-accession Aid and 
PHARE 
 
Adapted from Demetropoulou (2002) 
                                                 
4
 The White Paper is a highly important document of 1995, assessing the progress of the applicant states on 
the road to accession. It defines the scope of the legal harmonization required to include the CEECs into the 
EU internal market (EC, 1995). This document provided the CEECs with clear guidelines and reduced their 
degree of freedom in deciding on the scope of the process.  
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Table 2. Central and Eastern European Economies – Selected Macro Indicators 2006 
 
Country Population 
(000) 
GDP per capita 
$ 
Average monthly 
gross earnings 
$ 
Bulgaria 7 693 4 092 228 
Croatia 4 441 9 663 1 136 
Czech Republic 10 269 13 800 894 
Estonia 1 344 12 210 750 
Hungary 1 070 11 205 813 
Latvia 2 289 8 784 539 
Lithuania 3 393 8 778 545 
Poland 38 132 8 940 798 
Romania 21 590 5 646 409 
Slovakia 5 391 10 220 632 
Slovenia 2 009 18 562 1 521 
Source: National statistical offices, Central Banks, Eurostat, 2007 
 
Table 3. FDI evolution in Romania 
 
 
199
1 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
FDI, USD 
mil. 
37 73 87 341 417 263 1224 2040 1007 1051 1154 823 
FDI, % 
GDP 
0.1 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.1 0.7 3.4 4.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.6 
FDI, % 
current 
account 
deficit 
3.6 4.6 7.4 79.6 23.5 10.2 57.5 68.7 78.1 77.1 49.1 73.8 
FDI, % 
total net 
capital 
inflows 
1.9 3.4 6.0 12.7 26 7.3 36 89 124 27 28 25 
Source: ARIS INVEST – The Romanian Agency for Foreign Investment,  (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. FDI inflows in comparative perspective in 1991-96 and 2002 
 
 Average FDI (in million 
of US dollars) 
1991-96  1997-02     2002 
Average FDI per capita (in US 
dollars) 
1991-96    1997-02       2002 
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Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
         85        782          647 
       135       422          296 
    1,089     6,242      9,886 
    2,156     1,890         908 
       159        323         349 
         56        596         744 
    2,119      6,127     4,371 
       206      1,323     1,210 
       111         612     1,950 
       175      1,834     4,260 
        10             79             48 
       90          249           197 
     106          520        1,059 
     211          179           106 
       64          142           140 
       15          149           201 
       55          148           113 
          9           56             51 
        55          282          989 
        32          325       1,078 
TOTAL/average 
    6,254    20,152   24,621         59           175         257 
 Source: various issues of Economic Survey for Europe - UN Economic  
Commission for Europe 2003, World Development Indicators 2003 - World 
 Bank (2003) and IMF Balance-of-Payments database. 
 
Table 5. Romanian institutions for European integration 
 
The Department for European Integration (co-ordination) 
The Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration (decision-making, 
monitoring) 
The Specialized Units for European Integration (decentralization and 
implementation) 
The European Institute of Romania (counseling, research) 
The National Fund (treasure, supervision of financial administration) 
The Central Finance and Contracts Unit and the Implementation Agencies 
(management and implementation) 
 
Figure 1. Theorizing external influences on systemic transformation in CEECs 
 
  
EU 
Policy transfer 
Policy recipient 
Policy transfer 
Multilateral 
institutions (IMF, 
World Bank, etc.) 
Policy diffusion 
Markets and private 
actors (MNCs, 
NGOs, etc.) 
EU member 
states/CEECs 
Policy learning 
